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SITUATIOX II. 
vVar exists bet,veen States X andY. 1~he United States 
is neutral. A port of State X is placed under martialla,v. 
l\1r. B, a citizen of the United States, residing and doing 
business at the port, is seized, in1prisoned, and about to 
be deported w·i thou t trial. He appeals to the-commander 
of a United States "~ar vessel "-ho chances to be the only 
representative of the United .States in the region. 
What action, if any, is the commander justified in 
taking~ 
SOLl.JTIOX. 
The com1nander of the United States "-ar vessel 'vould 
be justified in requesting that ~fr. B be not arbitrarily 
deported 'vithout trial, that he have a prompt and fair 
trial by a military court or commission, and if the military 
exigencies make a trial impracticable) he 'vould be justi-
fied in requesting that l\Ir. B be placed in his custody. 
XOTES ON SITUATION II. 
Nature of 1nartiallaw.-Silent leges inter arrna is a com-
mon dictum of municipalla,v. This has been repeatedly 
recognized by the Government of the United States. 
The ordinary courts refuse to interfere 'vith the course 
of military judg1nent as enforced by courts-martial. .A.s 
affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Dynes v. 
Hoover (20 Ho,v., 65), "\\Tith the sentences of courts-
martial 'vhich have been convened regularly, and have 
proceeded legally, and by w·hich punishments are directed 
'vhich are not forbidden by }a,v, or w·hich are according 
to the la,vs and customs of the sea, civil courts have noth-
ing to do, nor are they in any 'vay alterable by them." 
As Halleck says: 
It is necessary to distinguish between military and martiallaw; for the two 
are very different. In Great Britain the former has only to do with the land 
forces mentioned in section 2 of the ~futiny Act-now the Army Art, 1881-
and the Articles of 'Yar. In the United States the Rules and Articles of 
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War constitute the l\lilitary law. This law exists equally in peace and in war, 
and is as fixed and definite in its provisions as the Admiralty, Ecclesiastical, 
or any other branch of law, and is equally with them a part of the general 
law of the land. But :Martial law originates either in the prerogative of the 
Crown, as in Great Britain, or from the exigency of the occasion, as in other 
States; it is one of the rights of sovereignty, and is as essential to the 
existence of a State as is the right to declare or carry on w·ar. It is a power 
inherent in every Government, and must be regarded and recognized by all 
Dther Governments. It is one of the incidents of war, invasion, or rebellion; 
and arises when there is no time for the slow and cumbrous proceedings of 
the Civil law. Like the power to take human life in battle, it results directly 
and immediately from the fact that war in name or in substance exists. 
(Halleck's International Law, Baker's ed., vol. 1, p. 544.) 
Application toM r. B.-lVfr. B, in the case under consid-
eration, is a citizen of the United States residing and doing 
business in the port of State X. This port is under martial 
la\v. He is not exempt by virtue of his United States 
citizenship from any of the legitimate consequences of 
\var. The Instructions for the Government of .... t\.rmies of 
the United States in the Field provide (Section 1, 7) that 
~'martial la\v extends to property, and to persons, 
\vhether they are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that 
Government." These Instructions, which have been 
generally approved as liberal by other States of the \Vorld, 
also provide (Section 1, 5) that ''martial la\v should be 
less stringent in places and countries fully occupied and 
fairly conquered. 1vfuch greater severity may be exer-. 
cised in places or regions \vhere actual hostilities exist, 
or are expected and must be prepared for. Its most com-
plete S\vay is allo,ved, even in the commander's O\Vn 
country, \vhen face to face \Vith the enemy, because of the 
absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount 
duty to defend the country against invasion." 
These rules of \var indicate the propriety of the suspen-
sion of the ordinary legal processes during the actual 
hostilities. This position has also been sustained by the 
Supreme Court of the United States. . • 
"If in foreign invasion or civil \Var, the courts are actu-
ally closed, and it is jmpossible to administer criminal 
justice according to la,v, then, on the theater of active 
military operations, \Yhere \var really prevails, there is 
necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, 
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thus oYerthro\\·n, to preserYc the safety of the a: n1y and 
of society; and as no po,\·er is left but the 1nilitary, it is 
allo,\·ed to goY ern by n1artial rule until the la \\·s can haYe 
their free course. As necessity ereates the rule, so it 
li1nits its duration; for, if this GoYerninent is continued 
after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of 
po,\·er. :\Iartial rule can neYer exist \\·here the courts are 
open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their 
jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual 
\\'"ar.'·' (Ex Parte JI illigan 4, "\"Vallace 2. ~Ir. Justice 
DaYis deliYered the opinion.) 
The fact that ~Ir. B, the citizen of t:he United States, 
\Vas do!ng business in State X gaYe to hin1 a more conl-
plete connection and interest in the affairs and destiny 
of State X than \\·otdd the siln pie fact of te1n porary 
SOJOUrn. 
Risley (La\\'" of "\"Var, p. 93) says: 
'\Vhere a person of whateYer n~tionality~ or his property, or a tract of 
territory, beco!lles connected with the enemy State in such a manner as to 
be a source, directly or indirectly, of strength and assistance to that State, 
such person, property, or territory must be regarded as being subject to or 
belonging to the enemy, and acquires an enemy character. 
Enemy character as attaching to persons and their property may arise 
from permanent allegiance to and residence within the territory of the 
adYerse belligerent, in which case it is complete: or it may be of a partial 
and temporary nature, limited to certain intents and purposes, arising from 
such particular circumstances as haYing possessions in enemy territory, or 
maintaining n house of commerce there, from personal residence there, 
or from pnrticular modes of traffic, such as sailing under the enemy's flag 
or passport. 
By this manner a belligerent's own subject or a neutral subject may 
acquire an enemy character depending upon a kind of implied temporary 
allegiance to the enemy State: but as soon as he chooses to terminate his 
hostile allegiance he terminates his hostile character. 
As \\·ell stated by Davis (Elen1en ts of In tern a tional 
La\\·, p. 333)-
JI artiallaw, or to speak more correctly military rule, or the law of hostile 
OCCUpation, is a term applied to the goYernment of an OCCUpied territory by 
the commanding general of the in,·ading force. ~Iartial law also pre,·ails 
in the immediate theater of operations of an army in the field. The 
reason in both cases is the same. The ordinary agencies of goYernment, 
including the machinery proYided for the preYention and punishment of 
crime, are suspended by the fact of war. This suspension takes place at a 
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time when society is Yiolently disturbed, when the usual restraints of law 
are at a minimum of efficiency, and when the need of such restraint is the 
greatest possible. This state of affairs is the direct result of the invasion, or 
occupation, of the disturbed territory by an enemy. The only organized 
power capable of restoring and maintaining order is that of the invading 
force, which is Yested in its commanding general. 
Upon him, therefore, inteniational law places the responsibility of pre-
serving order, punishing criine, and protecting life and property within the 
limits of his command. His pmver in the premises is equal to his responsi-
bility. In cases of extreme urgency, such as arise after a great battle, or the 
capture of a besieged place or a defended town, he may suspend all law and 
may punish crimes summarily, or by tribunals of his own constitution. . .. 
He appeal'S in the occupied territory as an agent of his government, charged 
with the conduct of certain military operations. His first responsibility is 
to his own government for the successful conduct of the military operations 
with the direction of which he is charged. In carrying on those operations 
his government and himself are bound by the la,vs of war. The usages of 
war authorize him to employ certain ·forcible measures toward his enemy. 
They forbid indiscriminate violence, the use·of excessive force, or the use of 
any force which does not contribute directly to the end for which the war is 
undertaken. His exercise of authority in the occupied territory must, 
therefore, be the least possible, consistent with these ends. 
Position of Department of State.-During the revolution 
in Ha,vaii, in 1895, the follo,ving telegram was sent by 
Mr. Gresham, Secretary of State, to ~1r. Willis: 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE' 
lVashington, February ~5, 1895. 
\Vith reference to your telegram of the 17th instant, touching the impris-
onment or condemnation of numerous persons in connection 'vith the recent 
disturbance in Hawaii, I observe your statement that 13 American citizens 
are still in prison without charges and without trinl. This Gm·ernment has 
no disposition to be exacting with that of Hawaii, especially under present 
circumstances, but it owes a duty to its citizens to see to it that they are not 
wantonly subje~ted to arbitrary treatment. Though martial law has been 
proclaimed, it does not follow that aliens innocent of participation in the 
acts which gave rise to its proclamation may be arrested and indefinitely 
imprisoned without charges and without trial. The existence of martial 
law, while it may imply the suspension of the methods and guaranties by 
which justice js ordinarily secured, does not imply a suspension of justice 
itself. You are instructed to insist to the Hawaiian Government that the 
American citizens still imprisoned without charge and without trial shall be 
promptly tried or promptly released. 
G.RESHAl\I. 
The letter of Nlr. Greshan1 to ~{r. vYillis of the san1c date 
'vith the above telegram, also defines the position of the 
United States in a special instance. It may be stated in 
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advance that the ~Ir. J. Crnnstoun mentioned belo\v "~as 
subsequently sho\\~n not to be an .:\..merican citizen. The 
letter is us follo\\~s: 
No. 66.1 DEPARTIIEXT OF STATE, 
lVashington, February 25, 1895. 
SIR: I haYe to acknowledge the receipt of your No. 86 of the 8th instant, 
in relation to afl'nirs in Hawaii, and particularly in relation to the forcible 
deportation on the 2d instant of three men, one of whom, :.Ir. J. Cranstoun, 
claims to be a citizen of the United States. 
I inclose herewith copies of certain depositions made by :.rr. Cranstoun 
on the 11th and 12th instant, before :Jir. Peterson, the commercial agent of 
the United States at Vancou,~er. These depositions leave the question of 
.1Ir. Cranstoun's nationality in doubt, and .1Ir. Peterson has been instructed 
to obtain further statements from him on that subject. 
Under these circumstances, the Department does not now instruct you 
to make any representations to the Hawaiian Government in regard to :Mr. 
Cranstoun, but it is proper to express to you, for your own guidance in 
similar cases, should they arise, the views here entertained in regard to the 
course of action taken in that case. 
It appears that after having been kept in jail for nearly a month, without 
any charges having been made against hrm, he was taken under a heavy 
guard to a steamer and would, in spite of his request to you, have been 
deported ,,·ithout having had an opportunity then to do so had it not been 
for the accidental but timely interposition of the British commissioner. 
You state that when you asked the attorney-general for an explanation 
of the proceeding he rf'plied that the cabinet had determined to deport the 
men "in the exercise of the arbitrary power conferred by martial law." 
As this was the only explanation he gave, it is pnsumed it \Yas all he had 
to offer, and he gave it without suggestion of any question as to :Jir. Crans-
toun's nationality. 
If the position thus assumed be sound, the very proclamation of martial 
law in Hawaii renders all foreigners there residing, including Alnericans, 
liable to arrest and deportation without cause and without any reason other 
than the fact that the executiYe power wills it. They may be taken from 
their homes and their business; they may bf' deprived of their liberty and 
banished; they may be denied the ordinary as well as the special treaty 
rights of residence without offense or misconduct on their part, simply in 
the exercise of "arbitrary power." 
To state such a proposition is, in the opinion of the President, to refute it. 
"Truly viewed," says an eminent author, "martial law can only change the 
administration of the laws, give them a rapid force, and make their penal-
ties CPrtain and effectual-not abrogat3 what was the justice of the com-
munity before The civil courts arc in part, or fully suspended, but, in 
reason, the new summary tribttnals should govern themselYcs in their pro-
ceedings, as far as circumstances admit, by established principles of justice 
the same which had been recognized in the courts." (Bishop's Criminal 
Law, Sf' C. 4.5.) 
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In view of what has been stated, your course in protesting against the 
position assumed by the attorney-general of Ha,vaii is approved. 
I am, etc., 
\V . Q. GRESHAM. 
(U.S. Foreign Relations, 1895, p. 842.) 
Position of the War Department.-A late opinion ren-
dered to the vVar Department of the United States by 
Hon. Charles E. :.J,Iagoon, la'v officer, Bureau of Insular 
~~flairs (The La'v of Civil Government Under 1Iilitary 
Occ'upation, p. 12), says: 
It will be seen that a military government takes the place of a suspended 
or destroyed sovereignty, while martial law or, more properly, martial rule, 
takes the place of certain governmental agencies which for the time being 
are unable to cope with existing conditions in a locality which remains sub-
ject to the sovereignty. 
The occasion of military government is the expulsion of the sovereignty 
theretofore existing, which is usually accomplished by a successful military 
mvaswn. 
The occasion of martial rule is simply public exigency, which may arise 
in time of war or peace. 
A military government, since it take~ the place of a deposed sovereignty 
of necessity continues until a permanent sovereignty is again established 
in the territory. :\lartial rule ceases when the district is sufficiently· tranquil 
to permit the ordinary agencies of government to cope with existing con-
ditions. 
The power of such government, in time of war, is a large and extraordi-
nary one, being subject only to such conditions and. restrictions as the laws 
of war impose upon it. 
As \vas said by the United States Supreme Court , such governing author-
ity" may do anything necessary to strengthen itself and weaken the enemy. 
There is no limit to the powers that may be exerted in such cases save those 
which arc found in the laws and usages of war. . In such cases 
the la,vs of war take the place of the Constitution and laws of the Lnited 
States as applied in the time of peace." (New Orleans v. Steamship Co., 
20 "Tall., 394.) 
Commenting on this view of the law, the Texas supreme court say: "This 
language, strong as it may seem, asserts a rule of international law recog-
nized as applicable during a state of war." (Daniel v. Hutcheson, 86 
Texas, 61.) 
~lartial rule, as exercised in any country by the commander of an invad-
ing army, is an elem.ent of jus belli. It is incidental to a state of war and 
appertains to the law of nations. The commander of the occupying army 
rules the territory within his military jurisdiction as necessity demands and 
prudence dictates, restrained by international law and obligations, the 
usages and laws of war, and the orders of his superior offic<.'rs of the govern-
ment he serves and represents. 
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Oonclusion.-lt is eYident that the conunander In a 
region under n1artial la'v has a right to exercise such a 
1neasure of control of all inhabitants of the region, 
'vhether natives or foreigners, as 1nilitary operations Inay 
require, and only that degree of force should be used 
'vhich is necessary to accon1plish the end of the 'var. 
Tllis end can not be brought about n1ore speedily by 
inflicting undue hardships on the innocent population; 
indeed, such action often prolongs hostilities. 
In the case of ~Ir. B, the citizen of the United States, 
at a port of State X, w·hich port is under Inartial la"~, it 
is proper, according to the position of the United States 
GoYernn1ent, that the ordinary processes of law· should 
be hastened, because the existence of such a state of jur-
isdiction i1nplies that ordinary court processes are not 
sufficiently effectiYe to Ineet iininediate exigencies. 
Even though :Jir. B is an alien in State X, the fact that 
he has been residing and doing business at the port ren-
ders hin1 liable to the consequences of his sojourn in the 
tilne of 'var, proYided the conunander declaring Inartial 
la'v does not exceed his authority in the action to"·ard 
l\Ir. B. 
The seizure of ~Ir. B is an act "·hich is w·ithin the field 
of proper authority of the con1n1ander enforcing Inartial 
la,v. The teinporary in1prisoninent n1ay be and often is 
necessary in the tin1e of Inartial la 'v. lin prison1nen t 
'vithout trial, ho"·ever, 1nay be only for the period of 
absolute Inilitary necessity. l\Iartialla"? does not i1nply 
the absence of justice in the treatment of the population 
'vhich Inay be under it for the tiine being, but rather the 
acceleration of the course of justice. As deportation and 
in1prisoninent for a considerable tin1e 'vithout trial 'vould 
imply the absence or denial of proper procedure under 
generally recognized principles of international la,v, the 
com1nander of the United States "·ar vessel "?ould be 
justified in hearing the appeal of th~ citizen of the United 
States, :Jir. B. He "?ould be further justified in asking 
for l\Ir. B a fair trial by a Inilitary court or coininission. 
If the n1ilitary exigencies Inake such a trial impracti-
cable, the conunander of the United States 'var vessel 
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\vould be justified in requesting that ~1r. B be placed in 
his custody, in "Thich case he \Vould be under obligation 
to see that ~1r. B conducts himself in a proper 1nanner 
\Yith regard to the authorities controlling the port. 
Such action \Vould accord 'vith the general principles 
of justice and "Tould be according to the instructions of 
the Department of State in the cases in Ha,vaii in 1895, 
\Yhen the Secretary said-
You are instructed to insist to the Hawaiian Government that the Amer-
ican citizens still imprisoned without charges and without trial shall be 
promptly tried or promptly released. 
The fundan1ental fact in all cases \Yhere martialla'v is 
declared is that it does not establish arbitrary authority 
\Vithout regard to la,v· in the commander of the region, but 
accelerates the course of justice so far as the military 
necessities at the ti1ne demand. 
